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Abstract: This paper explores some forms of interaction between the Catholic and Orthodox
churches in different contexts. Some of these forms are helpful, but not always efficient, and
some are not helpful. Theological dialogues belong to the former category of interactions: they
are helpful, but not efficient. Alliances on an ideological basis, for instance on the basis of “traditional
values,” are unhelpful, because they polarise the churches internally. This article instead proposes a
collaboration in the public domain as an alternative way of rapprochement between the two churches.
The Ukrainian Maidan (the revolution of 2014) exemplifies a co-working space, which proved to be
efficient for restoring trust between Orthodox and Greek Catholics.
Keywords: ecumenical dialogues; culture wars; ideology; public domain; maidan
What has been called the Great Schism between eastern and western Christianity was not a
one-day event. It was not even a one-year event, although the formal year of their separation is believed
to be 1054, when the delegation of the Roman See to Constantinople placed on the altar in Hagia
Sophia the bull of excommunication of the patriarch Michael Keroularios, and was excommunicated in
return. The process of separation began long before that date and was finalised long after (Louth 2007).
It lasted for centuries and was complicated; it comprised currents on different levels and was delayed
by many setbacks. Similarly, when the restoration of unity happens, it will not be a one-day or even
a one-year event. It will last long decades, maybe even centuries. As a matter of fact, this process is
already happening. Less time has passed since reconciliation began than it had taken for the process
of separation. As regards complexity, the process of reconciliation mirrors the complexity of the
separation at the turn of the second millennium. It features multi-layer currents and multiple setbacks.
In what follows, we will consider these three forms of the rapprochement between the Catholic
and Orthodox churches: theological dialogue, “ideological ecumenism,” and co-working in the public
square. Each of these forms has its advantages and disadvantages. Some of them are healthier and
more authentic, and others are less so.
At the top of the process of reconciliation, there is the official international Orthodox-Catholic
dialogue (Savvatos 2014, pp. 487–89). It is conducted by a commission, whose official name is
“The Joint International Commission for Theological Dialogue Between the Catholic Church and the
Orthodox Church.” This commission held its first session in 1980, a year after a formal decision to
have such a dialogue was taken by Pope John Paul II and Patriarch Demitrios of Constantinople.
The initial momentum for this dialogue was the first meeting since the Middle Ages between the Pope
of Rome, Paul VI, and the Patriarch of Constantinople, Athenagoras, in January of 1964 in Jerusalem.
The follow-up of that meeting was the lifting of the anathemas from 1054. This was a rather symbolic
act, which signified a turning point from the pattern of confrontation to the pattern of dialogue in the
relations between the two churches.
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The logic of any theological dialogue, including the one between the Orthodox and Catholic
churches, can be schematised in the following way. It is commonly believed that all major splits
in the church were caused by theological disagreements or, to be precise, by theological formulas.
In the case of the Orthodox-Catholic relationship, it was the insertion of Filioque to the Nicean creed.
After the church hierarchs disagreed on these formulas, they decided to cease communion with each
other. The restoration of unity, therefore, has to follow a reversed path: the hierarchs should agree
on common theological formulas and then could resume communion with each other. Theological
dialogues, thus, struggle to work out common theological formulas as an instrument of the restoration
of unity.
This logic, however, has a couple of faults. First, it is based on the belief in the “magic” power,
as it were, of theological formulas. This belief goes back to the era of scholasticism. This era began
not in Western Europe in the Middle Ages, but in Asia Minor in the Late Antiquity. Scholasticism
emerged in the fourth century and turned into a main theological method in the second part of the
fifth century, approximately during the generation of the disciples of Cyril of Alexandria.1 Cyril, who
was the most important theological figure in that period, concluded the era when the meaning of
theological formulas mattered more than their wording. That is why he was not consistent in the use
of theological language, as for instance in the case of the Christological formula, “one nature of the
incarnated God Word.”2 This was not yet a formula, but a part of a theological narrative. The disciples
of Cyril, however, turned this dictum to a formula, and disagreed on its interpretation.
Some of them synthesised a new Christological formula on the basis of the languages of Cyril and
Pope Leo. This formula, “one hypostasis of Jesus Christ in two natures,” was adopted by the council
of Chalcedon (Hovorun 2015a, p. 451). Another group of Cyril’s disciples, under the leadership of the
patriarch of Alexandria Dioskoros and the patriarch of Antioch Severos, opposed the Chalcedon and
insisted that the words of the Alexandrian archbishop should be taken literally. Both parties departed
from Cyril’s flexible attitude toward theological language and arrived at a scholastic perception of it.
As mentioned above, this early Byzantine scholasticism featured a belief in the almost magical
power of theological formulas. This attitude to theological formulas, as if they were “spells,” became
one of the reasons for the divisions between the churches in the fifth–sixth centuries. One group
refused to accept one nature in Jesus, while for the other, two natures was unacceptable. Their insistence
on a particular wording was different from the Arian controversy a century earlier. Unlike the terms
“one” and “two natures,” the terms homoousios (consubstantial), homoiousios (of a similar substance),
and homios (a similar) were not synonyms, but signified completely different relationships between the
Father and the Son in the Trinity. This difference in attitude to theological formulas explains why, in
contrast to the Nicean theologians in the fourth century, the so-called neo-Chalcedonian theologians,
who followed the council of Chalcedon and synthesised its language with the language of Cyril
(Hovorun 2015b, pp. 106–24), in the sixth century accepted the language of the anti-Chalcedonians
and agreed that the formula “one nature” can be used together with “two natures.” Unfortunately,
it was already too late to heal the division between Chalcedonians and anti-Chalcedonians, which
had already happened and had become institutionalised in parallel ecclesial structures. Thus, it is
not a coincidence that the first great schism between the churches in the fifth century; Rome and
Constantinople on the one side, and Alexandria and Antioch on the other, happened in the period of
the rise of early Byzantine scholasticism. A century before that, when an even more serious theological
issue of Arianism erupted, it did not cause the same sort of schism between Arians and Niceans. This
was partially because, in the fourth century, theologians could still go around formulas and accepted
different interpretations of the words.
1 I argue about this in my presentation “Cyril of Alexandria: a phenomenological theologian?” (Hovorun 2015a, pp. 378–444).
2 “Mί α φύσισ τoῦ Θεoῦ Λóγoυ σεσα$κωµένoυ.” Quod unus sit Christus, in (Durand 1964, p. 378).
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When, in the modern era, theologians put into theological formulas the same faith as in the fifth
century, they act anachronistically. In the era of abundance of hermeneutical methods, theological
formulas became disenchanted. By invoking them, theologians can no longer change the reality of
the church life—something they were able to do in the period of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages.
On the one hand, unity of the church cannot happen without agreeing on theological formulas. On the
other hand, even when churches agree on common theological formulas, these formulas do not have
the power to restore communion between churches anymore.
A second misleading assumption regarding theological formulas, as they are being discussed
in the dialogues, is that they are exclusively about theology. In the era of Late Antiquity, there were
not many semantic instruments to express people’s cultural and political concerns. Theology instead
offered the most elaborated language to talk about non-theological issues. That is why theological
formulas were underpinned by various political and social agendas; they were not just about theology.
For instance, Arianism, with its stress on the monarchy of the Father in the Trinity, effectively
enhanced the monarchy of the Christian emperors.3 Later theological movements, such as Severianism,
Monothelitism, and Iconoclasm, also contributed to the consolidation of imperial authority.
With the passage of time, theological formulas often turned into identities. Large groups of
people, which today would be called nations, adopted them as their distinct characteristics. For
instance, the emergence of Coptic ethnicity was facilitated by the rejection of the council of Chalcedon
by many Egyptian Christians. Armenians and Georgians also became polarised by their attitude to
the Chalcedon. Theological formulas turned into cultural phenomena and thus lost, to a great extent,
their original theological meaning. This means, for instance, that pro- and anti-Chalcedonian identities
of different Christian groups in the Middle East today do not imply that those groups understand
or give any significance to the Chalcedon as a theological phenomenon. Chalcedon now matters as
a cultural phenomenon only. Most people are not aware of the theological differences that had led
to the separation between the Eastern and Oriental churches in the fifth century. Nevertheless, they
would protect these differences as their identity against anyone who would try to undermine them.
If theologians and bishops would tell them that there are no theological differences anymore, this can
be perceived by the people on the both sides of the Chalcedonian divide as an existential threat to who
they are.
All these cultural connotations that theological formulas absorbed during their historic journey
make them an insufficient instrument for the restoration of Christian unity in our days. When the
official dialogues try to arrive at a common formula, they usually disregard its cultural connotations.
As a result, the method of theological formulas alone, unfortunately, cannot secure the restoration of
unity. What the theological formulas did in the past cannot be undone in the same way—by casting
their spell on the divide.
The dialogue between the Eastern and Oriental churches has demonstrated this persuasively.
This is the earliest of the bilateral dialogues (since 1964) and is the only one that has been completed
successfully.4 The dialogue resulted in two theological statements: one was adopted in 1989 in the
Anba Bishoy monastery in Egypt, and the other, a more elaborated version of the previous one, was
adopted in 1990 in Chambésy, Switzerland.5 The Chambésy statement contains theological formulas
based on the Christological language of Cyril of Alexandria. It repeats the wording elaborated in the
framework of Neo-Chalcedonianism. The articles of the Chambésy statement were drafted jointly by
the Chalcedonian and non-Chalcedonian theologians, and were eventually received by most members
3 This discussion was initiated by Erik Peterson in Der Monotheismus als politisches Problem; ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
politischen Theologie im Imperium Romanum (Peterson 1935).
4 This is a common Eastern and Oriental understanding of the results of this dialogue. What followed the completion of the
theological phase of the dialogue, was called a “pastoral” phase, which began in 1993 and was to solve practical issues, such
as commemoration of common Saints. See (Ovidiu 2014, pp. 508–28).
5 All the statements of the dialogue are available at (Orthodox Unity n.d.).
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of the dialogue. This was celebrated as a big success, which, however, was not acknowledged by all
churches officially. The reasons for this had to do not with theology, but with the role of theological
formulas as cultural denominators and people’s identities, as described above. It turned out that
theological matters do not matter for most Christians in the East any more, at least not to the extent
they used to matter when their churches departed from each other. Theology has turned into people’s
identity, and this identity cannot be changed just by theological formulas. As a result, both Eastern
and Oriental churches hesitate to implement the theological results of the dialogue and do not proceed
to the restoration of communion.
The same will probably happen to the Orthodox-Catholic dialogue, if one day it will produce
a common theological formula, which would resolve the differences between the two traditions.
Most likely, such a formula will not lead to the restoration of unity, at least not automatically. This
means that, in addition to theology, other issues should be tackled in the framework of the dialogue,
including people’s identities and culture. In other words, the dialogue should also deal with these
questions: what does it mean to be a Catholic or an Orthodox, and how are these identities perceived
by the followers of both traditions? These questions make the dialogue more complicated. However,
without addressing them, the dialogue will most probable stumble on the same obstacles that the
Eastern-Oriental dialogue has stumbled upon.
Dialogue is not a traditional way of solving theological issues. In the Byzantine past, such issues
were solved at councils, by the exchange of letters and delegations, and through the mediation of
emperors. Dialogue, as a form of conflict-resolution, is a product of modern times and was invented
to tackle political problems. This does not, however, make dialogue something alien to the church.
Moreover, it has effectively substituted other, more traditional, forms of rapprochement. Now it
constitutes the commonest instrument of rapprochement between the churches.
There are also other forms of interaction between the divided churches which can be borrowed
from political life. These forms can be both productive and counter-productive.
One of them employs ideological platforms and follows the pattern of the culture wars. The largest
clashing political platforms of our time are two ideologies, which can be called “liberal” and
“conservative.” Their names and polarity reflect mostly the American political system, and as such
they should not be applied too generally. Nevertheless, schematic distinction between “liberalism”
and “conservatism” can be useful in explaining different ideological currents in the churches, as well
as their attitudes to other Christians and to ecumenism.
The divide between “liberal” and “conservative” approaches seems to be stronger than many
other divides, including theological ones. Many churches experience internal divisions along this
ideological line. Conservative wings in these churches feel closer to each other than to the liberal wings
in their own churches. The same applies to the liberal wings. This creates a precondition for what can
be called “ideological ecumenism”—a rapprochement between the churches not on a theological basis,
but on an ideological one. In this ecumenism, theology is substituted by ideology.
In some sense, this substitution can be effective, because theology does not touch many people in
the churches anymore. Only a limited number of enthusiasts can follow theological arguments and
make them relevant to their lives and communities. Ideologies, in contrast, are capable of enchanting
many more people in the churches, especially when they are rendered in theological languages. As a
result, they have more power than theology to mobilise different groups in the churches.
Ideologies, however, do more harm than benefit to the churches. First, unlike theology, which
bridges this world with the divine, ideologies keep people confined to the agendas of this world. They
emerged in the period of the Enlightenment as a product of secularisation of Christian societies.6
As a result, they cannot elevate the human mind and spirit to God. Second, “ideological ecumenism”
disintegrates communities from within: it alienates “liberal” and “conservative” members of the
6 I analyse in detail the origins of ideologies in the modern era in “Ideology and Religion” (Hovorun 2016).
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churches and communities from each other. Third, ideologies cannot secure sustainable alliances
between followers of the same ideology from different churches.
The history of the American “fundamentalism” during the twentieth century clearly illustrates
these shortcomings of the “ideological ecumenism.” Soon after “fundamentalist” groups emerged in
the 1920s in different Protestant churches in the United States, they began approaching each other.
Simultaneously they distanced themselves from more “liberal” groups and thus caused schisms within
their own churches. For example, the Northern Presbyterians and Northern Baptists became divided
almost equally (Marsden 1980, pp. 164–65). The “fundamentalists” could not reconcile themselves
with those whom they called “liberals,” because they considered the latter to believe in almost a
different religion. Characteristic in this regard is a statement by J. Gresham Machen (1881–1937) from
the Princeton Theological Seminary:
In the sphere of religion, in particular, the present time is a time of conflict; the great
redemptive religion which has always been known as Christianity is battling against
a totally diverse type of religious belief, which is only the more destructive of the
Christian faith because it makes use of traditional Christian terminology. This modern
non-redemptive religion is called “modernism” or “liberalism.” (Machen 1923, p. 2)
At the same time, the “fundamentalists” perceived other “fundamentalists” as belonging to their
own religion, even though they belonged to other churches. Thus, “fundamentalist” alliances began
developing (Harris 1998, p. 28). One of the earliest of these was the World Christian Fundamentals
Association (WCFA). In such alliances, ideological conservatism became more important than the
doctrinal differences between denominations. Most of these attempts, however, failed to sustain
themselves for a long time or to foster productive cooperation between the churches.
Ideological alliances occurred not only on the basis of conservative ideology. Liberal ideology
also sometimes tried to substitute for theology in the ecumenical movements. The largest ecumenical
organisation in the world, the World Council of Churches (WCC), which was constructed on theological
principles, from time to time fell into the trap of ideological bias, mostly of a leftward tilt. This was, for
instance, when the Orthodox churches from the Soviet Block tried to promote through the WCC the
ideological agendas of the Communist regimes behind them. These agendas resonated with many
“liberal” Christians in the global ecumenical movement.
Moreover, antagonism between pro-ecumenical and anti-ecumenical movements within different
churches can be also interpreted as an extrapolation of ideology-based cultural wars. For many
anti-ecumenical groups, which exist in most churches, their dissatisfaction with the ecumenical
movement is a way to promote their conservative agenda. For instance, radical anti-ecumenists in the
Orthodox world, such as groups of the so-called “True Orthodox Christians” or “Old-calendarists,”
are radical conservatives with clear ideological and political agendas. In a similar way, many groups
in the churches who promote the ecumenical agenda are also liberal. Ecumenism for many is a way of
expressing and practicing their open liberal views. This does not, however, necessarily undermine
their desire for Christian unity.
A recent example of “ideological ecumenism” is an attempt to establish an alliance between
the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches. This initiative was suggested by the Russian
church. The logic of such an offer from Moscow is explained by the following. Soon after Patriarch
Kirill was elected as the new primate of the Russian Orthodox Church in 2010, he led the church in a
strictly conservative direction. “Liberals” were libelled as not-quite-Orthodox, and conservatism was
proclaimed a standard of Orthodoxy. At that time, the pope of Rome was a conservative, Benedict XVI.
The coincidence of two primates who promoted a similar conservative agenda urged some to promote
an alliance between the two churches on the basis of this agenda. Fortunately, this initiative was not
picked up by Rome. It is unlikely that such an alliance would have survived under the more liberal
Pope Francis.
The political framework offers to the churches not only temptations, but also healthy opportunities
for rapprochement. This is particularly the case when the churches work together for the same causes
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of justice and solidarity. These causes are not ideological. Unlike ideologies, which project political
programs onto religion and thus reduce the theological scope of the church, causes of justice and
solidarity project the principles of Christian faith onto the public domain. These causes do not reduce
or constrain the nature and purpose of the church, but implement its theological vision through social
action. Therefore, this sort of social activity of the church does not incur the same sort of reductions
that ideologies do. It does not divide churches according to ideological criteria, but actually bridges
different ideological platforms. When churches struggle together for the same causes of justice and
solidarity, they grow closer to each other. This can be illustrated by the following scheme (Figure 1):
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Unfortunately, after the victory of the “Revolution of dignity,” some churches withdrew from
the common public space and locked themselves up in their usual rhetoric of exclusion and
condemnation of others. In particular, this happened to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the
Moscow Patriarchate. The momentum towards rapprochement, which was created by the Maidan,
was quenched. This occurred mostly because of the Russian aggression against Ukraine that followed.
Russian propaganda flooded Ukraine with “post-truth” filled with the messages of hatred and division.
The Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine appeared most vulnerable to the effects of this propaganda.
Nevertheless, the Maidan showed the Ukrainian churches a pattern towards reconciliation, which
can parallel more traditional dialogues. Particularly interesting is how the Orthodox and Greek
Catholic churches came along. At the public square of the Maidan, their faithful and priests stood next
to each other. The Maidan, thus, showed that the Orthodox and Greek Catholic church can be best
friends and not necessarily antagonists. This can serve as an example for the Orthodox and Catholic
churches. Pursuing common good in the public domain can help them continue moving closer to
each other. This does not mean that the co-working of the churches in the public square should be a
substitute dialogue and other ways of rapprochement. It only means that such work can and should
be done in parallel to theological conversations.
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